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Circuit Council Reform: A Boat Hook for Judges
and Court Administrators
Michael J. Remington*
In quiet and untroubled times it seems to every administrator that it is only by his efforts that the whole population
under his rule is kept going, and in this consciousness of being
indispensable every administrator finds the chief reward of his
labor and efforts. While the sea of history remains calm the
ruler-administrator in his frail bark, holding on a boat hook to
the ship of the people and himself moving, naturally imagines
that his efforts move the ship he is holding on to. But as soon
as a storm arises and the sea begins to heave and the ship to
move, such a delusion is no longer possible. The ship moves
independently with its own enormous motion, the boat hook no
longer reaches the moving vessel, and suddenly the administrator, instead of appearing a ruler and a source of power, becomes an insignificant, useless, feeble man.'

Troubled waters surround the federal judicial vessel. For
years, even in calmer seas, water has come dangerously close to
washing over the gunwale of the craft. Too many passengers
huddled aboard have caused the vessel to sink lower and 10wer.~
* Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives.
B.S., 1967, J.D., 1973, University of Wisconsin.
The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent the views
of the House Committee on the Judiciary or of any Members of the United States
Congress.
I would like to express special appreciation to Frank J. Remington, Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., and Russell Wheeler for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. In addition, I would like to thank Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman,
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice, for making this Article possible.
1. L. TOLSTOY,
WARAND PEACEbk. 11, 507 (L. & A. Maude trans. 1952).
2. Much has been written about the overload crisis in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice: Hearings on State of the Judiciary and
Access to Justice Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereOF JUSTICE
inafter cited as Hearings on the State of the Judiciary]; U.S. DEPARTMENT
COMMI'LTEE
ON REVISION
OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
SYSTEM,
THE NEEDSOF THE FEDERAL
COURTS
1-4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NEEDSOF THE FEDERALCOURTS];
THE POUND
CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES
ON JUSTICE
IN THE FUTURE
(A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979)
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Fortunately, the boat is watertight and its excellent buoyancy
has kept it afloat.
The purpose of this Article is not to discuss the overall seaworthiness of the federal judiciary or the number of passengers
it carries. The Article will, however, discuss several basic
problems of judicial administration and place them in their historical context. It will then examine the administrative structure
that has kept the craft on an even keel in the past. Finally, it
will discuss a recently enacted statute, The Judicial Councile
Reform & Judicial Conduct & Discipline Act of 1980 (Judicial
Councils Reform A~t)~-aboat hook of sorts-that will provide
federal judges and judicial administrators with a modest tool to
keep abreast of their obligations.' This tool will not save the judicial branch, but if used properly it will be a useful implement.
AND PROBLEMS
OF JUDICIAL
I. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
ADMINISTRATION

A. Tension Created By The Separation of Powers

Ours is a constitut.ional government based on a separation
of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches.' Article I11 of the Constitution-the judiciary's bea[hereinafter cited as POUND
CONFERENCE];
H. FRIENDLY,
FEDERALJURISDICTION:
A GENVIEW3-4 (1972).
The Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Peter W. Rodino, Jr., has
observed: "One of the most difficult and persistent problems facing the House Judiciary
Committee is what to do about the ubiquitous overload in the federal courts--an overload so insidious that it threatens the very health of the entire federal judicial system."
Rodino, Magistrates' Reform-A Way to Aid Congested Federal Courts, 13 TRUL 32
(Nov. 1977).
I t should be recognized, however, that some now question the existence of a congestion crisis. See Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 L. & Soc. REV.371 (1980).
3. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035.
4. The principal purpose of the Judicial Councils Reform Act is to create a mechanism and procedure through which the judicial branch can consider and respond to complaints against federal judicial officers. Id. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in [1980]
U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS7767, 7767. Equally important, the Act is designed to
improve the overall functioning of the decentralized circuit councils, recipients of the
bulk of the legislatively delegated judicial discipline and disability responsibility. H.R.
REP.NO. 96-1313,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-304,96th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 3-5 (1979). By delaying the effective date of the legislation until October 1, 1981, the
Congress gave the judicial branch adequate time to prepare for the Act's impact. Pub. L.
NO. 96-458, 5 7, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
5. That "the doctrine of separation of powers . . . is at the heart of our Constitution" scarcely needs reiteration. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,119 (1976). See Kilbourn v.
ERAL
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con-vests the independent judicial power of the United States
"in one Supreme Court" and in "inferior" federal courts.= However, it authorizes Congress to organize the Supreme Court7 and
Since Conto establish inferior courts as it deems necessar~.~
gress is the creator of the structure and jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts, there is little question that the legislative branch
possesses the resultant mandate of overseeingBthe functioning
of almost all the federal judicial system, including its management and administration.lo Congress also has the budgetary authority to do this. These responsibilities are important and
should be taken seriously.
As befits a system of separation of powers with checks and
balances, there is a counterweight to Congress' authority to oversee and legislate for the federal judiciary. The framers promoted
the independence of the judiciary by providing lifetime tenure
for judges, erecting a bar against diminution of judges' salary
while in office,ll and equipping the federal judiciary with the
power to review Congressional enactments.12 Indisputably, in
American history "[aln independent judiciary has been a great
rock in stormy seas."ls
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 47 (J. Madison).
OF AMERICAN
LAW:THE LAW
6. U.S. CONST.art. 111, 8 1. See J. HURST,THEGROWTH
MAKERS
108-09 (1950). Professor Hurst relates that the decision to create and organize
the inferior Federal courts had two implications. First, as compared to many state constitutions, it left room for future possibilities of flexible experimentation and adjustment.
Second, it meant that in any test of strength between Congress and the inferior courts,
Congress could prevail. Id. at 109.
7. U.S. CONST.art. 111, 8 2. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction "with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make" over all cases within the judicial power of the United States. Id. at cl. 2. For
further discussion, see Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 109 U . PA. L. REV.157 (1960).
8. U.S. CONST.art. 111, 8 1. The First Congress-in the Judiciary Act of 1789--exercised its option to create lower federal courts. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
9. The "oversight function" of Congress is relatively new. It was first authorized by
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, now codified at 2 U.S.C. 8 190d(a) (1976).
10. See, e.g., Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 7 (letter from
Warren E. Burger); REPORTON THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE HOUSECOMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-61 (1981).
11. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
12. Although not expressly conveyed in the Constitution, the power of the federal
courts to test legislative enactments was soon found to be implicit. Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. W. DOUGLAS,
THE COURT
YEARS1939-1975, a t 195 (1980). The House Judiciary
Committee has shown great respect for this proposition: "The Committee recognizes that
it would venture onto very thin constitutional turf if it elected to erode the cherished
value of judicial independence: which may be of more importance today than it was
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A tension exists between the constitutional mandate to preserve and protect the independence of the judiciary and the congressional responsibility to equip the courts with a modern, flexible, rational and responsible administrative structure. Yet, both
independence and efficiency are necessary components of our judicial system. An independent judiciary is an empty shell if citizens lack confidence in it." Constitutional rights are meaningless if there are no adequate procedures to vindicate them and if
governmental institutions fail to act with integrity, honesty, consistency, and efficiency.16
Throughout its history the judicial branch, with a modicum
of congressional support, has shown a resilient ability to evolve
new mechanisms and procedures to meet the constantly changing demands placed on it.16 In short, it is possible that out of
this tension between the independence of the federal judiciary
and congressional involvement in the administration of the federal courts can come understanding and satisfaction of both judicial independence and effective administration. A thoughtful
federal judge, writing in this law review, aptly observed, "Out of
conflict may come acceptable and even beneficial compromise.
The inevitable conflict, the inherent tension, need not be disruptive of the work of doing justice."17
Due to its national perspective and political responsibility,
Congress paints in broad brush strokes when it specifies the parameters of federal jurisdiction and structure.18 However, bewhen the Constitution was written." H.R. REP.No. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1980).
14. There are grounds to believe that this is occurring. In a recent public opinion
poll, only 29% indicated a high degree of confidence in the federal courts, the more
knowledgeable and experienced the individual, the more likely that he would have unfavorable feelings about the courts. Yankelovich, Skelly, & White, Inc., The Public Image
of the Courts: Highlights of a National Survey of the General Public, Judges, Lawyers,
BLUEPRINT
FORTHEFUTURE
5 (T. Fetter ed.
and Community Leaders, in STATECOURTS:
1978).
15. See, e.g., Judicial Tenure and Discipline-1979-80: Hearings on Judicial Tenure and Discipline 1979-80 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 160 (1979-1980) (Statement of Maurice Roeenberg) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on Judicial Tenure].
16. Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 2, at 373.
17. See Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe
with Only Chiefs, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 39,39. Judge Wallace was referring to a different,
albeit similar, tension that exists within the judicial branch: that between judicial independence and effective internal administration.
18. See generally Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 3-4
(statement of Robert W. Kastenmeier); Kaatenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and
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cause of the nature of day-to-day judicial administration and
management, Congress properly plays a more limited role in this
area. It is unlikely that the federal judiciary could tolerate the
burden of continuous tinkering required to cure every little outcropping of inefficiency. Congressional efforts to become intimately involved in the daily &airs of the judiciary by creating
priorities for certain civil cases, special appeal routes, and
mandatory appeals have for the most part proven to be failures.Is Further, the solution to many problems of judicial administration can and should be self-imposed by the judiciary itself,
which generally is able to deal with them.
If Congress provides the structure to meet the constantly
changing responsibilities given the courts, and if the judiciary is
willing to impose some time-proven management techniques on
itself, then more efficient administration of justice can be
achieved. Let us now turn to an examination of judicial administration problems presently confronting the federal judiciary.

B. Basic Problems of Federal Judicial Administration
The most visible symptoms of the problems confronting the
federal judicial system are the overburdened courts and high
costs of litigation caused by the legalization and judicialization
of American society on a massive scale.M These problems, if not
diagnosed and effectively treated within the near future, will
have deleterious long-term effects. As the United States Department of Justice aptly observed, court congestion and rising costs
are only two of the many signs of how skyrocketing caseloads are
Access to Justice: A Legisbtive Perspective, 16 HARV.J. LEGIS.301 (1979).
19. At last count, there were at least sixty-two civil priorities, some applying to the
trial level, some to the appellate level, and some to both. Those interested in improving
judicial machinery have long been interested in abolishing all but the most necessary of
these priorities. See, e.g., Report No. 109A to the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association by the Special Subcommittee on Coordination of Judicial Improvements
211 (Midyear Meeting 1977). It is interesting to note that the ABA Resolution endorses
the principle that the circuit council of each court of appeals set calendar priorities for
the circuit.
As to dissatisfaction with the creation of special appeal routes, see 124 CONG.REC.
H10,747 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
As relates to the need to abolish the mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
JUDICIAL
CENTER,
REPORT OF THE STUDYGROUPON THE CASELOAD
OF THE
see FEDERAL
SUPREME
COURT
25-38 (1972); NEEDSOF THE F F ~ R ACOURTS,
L
supra note 2, at 11-13.
20. The United States has far more lawyers per capital than any other country in
the world. According to the American Bar Association, the number of practicing attorneys increased 83% between 1970 and 1980.
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damaging our court system.
There are others. Courts are forced to add more clerks,
more administrative personnel, to move cases faster and faster.
They are losing time for conference on cases, time for reflection, time for the deliberate maturation of principles. We are,
therefore, creating a workload that is even now changing the
very nature of courts, threatening to convert them from deliberative institutions to processing institutions, from a judiciary
to a bureacracy. This development, dangerous to every citizen
in our democracy, must be arrested and reversed. And it must
be done in ways that will preserve the quality of justice in our
federal courts.a1

A respected federal judge seconded this diagnosis by warning
that the federal courts have "too much work, too little time to
do it, the necessity for delegation, inefficient management and,
ultimately, the dilution of responsibility for decision-making?
Caseload statistics show constant increases in the amount of
adjudicative work courts are expected to do? Furthermore,
cases filed in federal courts are becoming more complex and require more active participation by the trial judge not only to resolve the case on the merits but to formulate complex forms of
21. NEEDSOF THE FEDERAL
COURTS,
supra note 2, at 4.
22. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice
DAMELAW.648, 654 (1980).
and Efficiency,55 NOTRE
23. Although it can be argued persuasively that "statistics never prove anything," E.
SCHUMACHER,
SMALL
IS BEAUTIFUL
20 (1973), and that case filings are a poor approximation of what really happens in court, Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 2, at 386-87, they are
the only measure that we have. Statistics show that in the eighteen-year period between
1960 and 1978, the number of cases docketed in the federal district courts doubled, the
number of appeals taken to the circuit courta of appeals increased fivefold, and the number of cases filed in the Supreme Court doubled. [I9601 DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE
ANN.REP.61-62; [I9791 DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICEU.S. COURTS
ANN.
U.S. COURTS
REP.2-7. During this same time period, United States magistrates (which did not even
exist before 1968) disposed of several hundred thousand matters. See Diversity of Citizenship JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform: Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
86, 182 (1977) (statements of Joseph D. Tydings and Daniel Meador).
More work needs to be done in the area of statistical reporting. For example, there
never has been an effort to factor in legislative improvements to judicial machinery. Although the district court filings have doubled, the amount of work per judge has not
increased. In addition, weighted caseload reporting is still far behind the times. Clearly,
more research needs to be done. See Hurst, The Functions of Courtb in the United
States, 1950-1980 (Working Paper 1980-1, Disputes Processing Research Program, Univ.
of Wisconsin, Madison); Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller, & McDougal, Measuring the Pace
81, 113 (1981).
of Civil Litigation in Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE
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ongoing relief.24 Sometimes governmental activities are implicated, and often the relief granted affects persons not directly
involved in the litigation. The remedy ordered may therefore require the trial judge's continuing participation in administration
and implementation." This is often the situation in cases involving the rights of institutionalized persons, school desegregation,
employment discrimination, environmental litigation, and
antitru~t.~~
The growth of the judicial workload, both in terms of numbers and complexity, shows no signs of abating. For example, the
96th Congress-not known as an activist Congress-created at
least nine new federal causes of action.27 Even those recommending a slowdown in federal regulation and intrusion into the
daily lives of citizens have put forward proposals that will increase the work of the federal courts.28
24. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Pulic Law Litigation, 89 HAW. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
Judge Henry J. Friendly put it succinctly by stating during a congressional hearing,
"Being a Federal judge today . . . is an altogether different and infinitely more demanding business than when I went on the bench eighteeen years ago." Diversity of Citizenship JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform: Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
210 (1977).
25. Chayes, note 24 supra. Professor Chayes concludes that the developing style of
litigation has become a quasi-political process, with courts playing a role normally reserved for the legislature.
26. As examples of these types of cases, see Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (rights of mentally retarded persons who are institutionalized);Pugh v.
Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (rights of prison inmates who are
institutionalized).
For Congressional approval of this sort of public law dispute resolution, see Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980).
27. Unsurprisingly, these bills were all in areas of rapid societal change: energy, environmental protection, privacy, transportation, and civil rights. See, e.g., Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships, Pub. L. No. 96-478, § 11,94 Stat. 2297 (1980); Swine Health Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 96-468, § 7,94 Stat. 2229 (1980); Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-454, g 7,94 Stat. 2011 (1980); Privacy Protection Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440,s 106,94 Stat. 1879; Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of
1980, 96 Pub. L. No. 96-320, 114,94 Stat. 974; Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96294, $9 161-68, 94 Stat. 611, 672 (1980); Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-247, 5 3, 94 Stat. 349 (1980); Emergency Energy Conservation Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-102,93 Stat. 749; Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,
Pub. L. NO. 96-95, fj 7, 93 Stat. 721.
28. See S. 111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This proposal, commonly referred to as
the Bumpers Amendment, provides for a higher standard of judicial review for administrative agency rulemaking. This bill has taken amendment form on several occasions. See
the Sept. 7,1979 amendment of Senator Bumpers to Senate bill 1477, the Federal Courts
Improvements Act, 125 CONG.REC. S12,145 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979), and the Oct. 30,
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Unfortunately, the increasing volume and complexity of
cases is not the sole problem. Statistics concerning caseloads and
the concomitant administrative responsibility to preside over a
case until final disposition do not tell the entire story of the role
played by the federal judiciary. These statistics merely measure
the traditional aspect of what courts do: that is, resolve controversies in an adversary setting. When assessing the burdens on
federal judges, it is important to recognize that courts now and
in the past have engaged in a broad spectrum of nonadjudicative
endeavors. These functions, which have also escalated with time,
add substantial administrative problems. Their impact is certainly felt by an Article I11 judge during the normal workday.
These nonadjudicative responsibilities may conveniently be
organized into four categories: legislative, executive, administrative, and ceremonial. In the legislative context, Congress generally has assigned the judiciary a significant rulemaking authorit^.'^ At the trial level, court rules have been adopted by most
district courts; similarly, every court of appeals has issued
rules.s0 Moreover, Congress specifically has given the courts responsibility for devising plans for the administration of the
Criminal Justice Act,"' the Jury Selection and Service Act:2 and
the Speedy Trial Act.= These latter activities relate to the critically importantto Congress, at leastiimplementation of laws
governing the judicial system. The courts also act as general supervisors of the legal professi~n.~
As to the executive powers of the judicial branch, Congress
has delegated responsibility to make appointments to judicial'l5
1980 amendment to House of Representatives bill 3806, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Act, 125 CONG.REc. S13,877 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1980) (Part 11).
29. The overall authority of the federal judiciary to promulgate rules is found in two
enabling acts, cdified in 18 U.S.C. 8 3771 (1976) (criminal procedure) and 28 U.S.C. 5
2072 (1976) (civil procedure). Congress has retained some residual authority to reject or
modify rules.
30. See generally Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76
L. REV.905, 906 (1976).
COLUM.
31. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 8 2, 78 Stat. 552 (1964), (current version at 18 U.S.C. 5
3006A(a) (1976)).
32. Pub. L. No. 90-274, 8 101, 82 Stat. 54 (1968), (current version at 28 U.S.C. $3
1861-1875 (1976)).
33. Pub. L. No. 93-619, tit. I, 8 101, 88 Stat. 2076 (1973), (current version at 18
U.S.C. 55 3161-3174 (1976)).
34. See FED.R. APP. P. 46; ~ T HCIK R. 27.
35. See 28 U.S.C. 8 631(a) (Supp. I11 1979) (magistrates); 11 U.S.C. 5 62 (1976)
(bankruptcy referees). The latter appointive power will terminate on April 1, 1984, the
effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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and executiveMbranch positions. Often this appointive power is
structured with somewhat rigid statutory procedures and merit
selection standards.s7
In the area of nonadjudicative administrative authority,
Congress has given the courts the specific responsibility of issuing electronic eavesdropping orders:8 managing the grand jury?
overseeing plea bargaining:O
and sentencing convicted
criminals? To help the judiciary carry out these functions, Congress has created at least one special court4' and has authorized
the creation of institutes and joint councils on senten~ing.~.
As to ceremonial functions, federal judges continue to naturalize aliensU and, on occasion, to conduct marriage^.^^ Further,
judges often administer oaths to newly appointed or elected offic i a l ~Records
.~~
usually have to be kept of these actions, imposing yet another burden on the courts.
In short, anyone who wants to discuss the administrative
problems of the federal judiciary must recognize that federal
judges are "charged with a large number of official responsibilities that do not fall within the adjudicatory role of dispute res o l v e ~ "These
~ ~ nonadjudicative functions add altogether different responsibilities and problems to a judge's agenda. Because a
36. 28 U.S.C. 8 546 (1976) provides that when the office of United States Attorney is
vacant, the district court may make an interim appointment. However, the President
still retains the authority to remove such a temporary U.S. attorney. 28 U.S.C. 8 541(c)
(1976).
In addition, pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act, the Chief Justice of the
United States assigns three judges or justices to a special division of the District of Columbia Circuit for the purpose of appointing "special prosecutors." 28 U.S.C. $3 49,591598 (Supp. I11 1979).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (Supp. I11 1979) (appointment of U.S. magistrates).
38. 18 U.S.C. g 2518 (1976) (amended 1978).
39. 18 U.S.C. $8 3331-3333 (1976).
40. See FED.R. GRIM. P. ll(e); see also 18 U.S.C. 8 3575 (1976).
41. At present, there is no general federal sentencing law. Criminal code proposals
are all in agreement that there sh'ould be a comprehensive statutory statement on sentencing. See S. 1722,95th Cong., 2d Sess. @ 2001-2306 (1980); H.R.6915,96th Cong., 2d
SW. 54 3101-3708 (1980).
42. 50 U.S.C. 5 1803 (Supp. I11 1979).
43. 28 U.S.C. 5 334 (1976). See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 55 7.1-7.2 (Approved
Draft 1968).
44. 8 U.S.C. $8 1447-1450 (1976).
45. This is done pursuant to local statute.
46. See, e.g., U.S.CONST.art. 11, 5 1, cl. 7.
47. Schwartz, The Other Things That Courts Do 1 (1980) (unpublished paper prepared for the Council on the Role of Courts, Washington, D.C.).
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judge's time is finite, the effective handling of these obligations
may conflict with what is perceived to be the principal task of
lifetime-tenured judges-resolving disputes in an adversary
setting.48
In response to the federal judiciary's multiple responsibilities (some of which are imposed by legislation and others of
which are created by the courts themselves), the court reformers' constant hue and cry has been "Create more judgeships," or,
in the alternative, "Give the judges more support personnel."
Congress has acted again and again, passing omnibus judgeship
bills, increasing the powers of subordinate judicial officers, and
granting judges more staff support.4aEven taking into consideration the augmented number of judgeships, during the past
twenty-five years the ratio of total judicial branch staff to judges
(including retired judges) has increased over fifty percent?O
As the district and circuit courte' judge and staff resources
have increased, there has been an equal-if not greater-growth
in the amount of administrative work imposed on these courts.
And, ominously, the pending case backlog has actually risen. An
apt analogy is the phenomenon that occurs when transportation
experts act to alleviate downtown traffic congestion by building
more parking lots. Often, the solution is only short-term, and
over the long-run congestion worsens because more people drive
their automobile^.^^
48. Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 112-13 (statement of
Burt Neuborne), 150-53 (statement of Shirley M. Hufstedler).
49. See, e.g., The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486,92 Stat. 1629,
which authorized the addition of 117 district judges and 35 circuit judges to the federal
judiciary.
But see Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 251 (Statement of
Robert H. Bork): "[Mly belief is that the Federal judiciary is now too large as it stands."
In its report on the omnibus judgeship bill, the House Committee on the judiciary
found that the federal judiciary cannot be expanded interminably without endangering
its high quality. H.R. REP.NO. 95-858, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
50. In 1954 the ratio of staff to judges was eleven to one; in 1980 it was seventeen to
one. Rubin, supra note 22, at 651. These figures refer not only to in-chambers staff, but
also to supporting personnel such as probation officers and the staffs of clerks' offices. By
an even greater proportion, Congress has increased the budget of the federal judiciary. I .
fiscal year 1961 the total budget, excluding the Supreme Court, was $48,325,700, the
total for fiscal year 1980 was $578,959,000, a nearly twelvefold increase. [I9601 DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICEU.S. COURTSANN. REP. 189; [I9791 DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE U.S. COURTS
ANN. REP.36.
51. For a similar view, see Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal IntermediJ.L. REF.201, 209 (1978). See also Federal Courts
ate Appellate Court, 12 U . MCH.
Improvement Act of 1979: Addendum to Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
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President Jimmy Carter understood that creating more
judgeships was only a partial remedy to the difficulties facing
the federal judiciary. In a message to Congress he observed,
[Ulnless we improve the system of justice itself, we may find
that the additional judges have been swallowed up by outmoded procedures and by an ever-rising volume of cases. We must
take prompt and effective steps to eliminate the remaining obstacles to efficiency in the justice system and to increase access
to Federal courts by those with Federal claims.6g

Already, this has proved to be true. The short-term solution of
increasing the size of the federal judiciary by adding judges and
staff has forced many judges, especially chief judges at the circuit and district level, to assume more and more administrative
responsibility, thereby diminishing their abilities to adjudicate
cases or, in the alternative, forcing them to delegate ministerial
functions to subordinate^.^^
Delegation creates a whole new host of problems. It requires
active management and quality control by the delegating authority. If not monitored properly and if not assigned to a qualified individual, delegation may not save time or contribute to
responsible decisionmaking. Haphazard and ill-managed delegation has resulted in inconsistent treatment of similar administrative issues throughout the federal judicial system. The way in
which delegation has occurred has also often concealed the identity of the decision-maker who should be held accountable if the
system is not working properly.
Nonetheless, delegation of administrative responsibility
under well-monitored and well-managed circumstances is clearly
preferable to diminishing the role that tenured federal judges
are so well equipped to fulfill:
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979) (statement of Daniel J. Meador).
For an excellent analysis of the problems posed by the creation of federal judgeIN THE FEDERAL
COURTS:
OPTIONS
FOR REFORM
ships, see C. BUR, JUDGESHIP CREATION
(Federal Judicial Center 1981). The gist of Professor Baar's proposal is that if a few
parking spaces were added on an annual basis when the need arose, it would not frustrate the ability of the public to shift from the automobile to alternatives. Opening the
floodgates on a periodic basis, however, raises expectations to a high pitch and encourages more flooding.
52. Presidential Message of February 27,1979, reprinted in Diversity of Citizenship
JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform: Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/
Magistrates Reform Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1979).
supra note 2, at 30.
53. See H. FRIENDLY,
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adjudicating disputes in traditional Federal subject matter areas such as copyright, patents, trademarks, commerce, bankruptcy, antitrust, and admiralty; rendering speedy criminal justice for those accused of crimes; protecting the basic civil and
constitutions1 liberties of all citizens; and resolving vital and
often recently identified rights (and sometimes rights not yet
identified by the legislative branch) which relate to welfare, occupational safety, the environment, consumerism, and
privacy.*

There is nothing in the constitutional debates or the two-hundred-year history of the federal judiciary to indicate that Article
111 judges, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and equipped with judicial tenure, are to
spend their working time making routine administrative decisions. What is clear is that from the beginning days of this country the revolutionary idea was that the judiciary was to protect
the rights of citizens and to establish justice under law." Increasing administrative demands may prohibit the judges from
having the time to carry out these traditional responsibilities.
Thus, the caseload explosion and the large increases in the
number of court personnel have placed pressures on the federal
judicial system never imagined by those who drafted the Constitution? As a result new burdens have been placed on the
courts' administrative structure, not a single element of which,
with the exception of the office of the Chief Justice of the
United States, existed at the beginning of the 20th century.
These pressures imperil the judiciary's ability to effectively perform the basic functions given it by the framers of the
Constitution.
54. H.R. REP.NO. 95-893, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
55. Madison explained in the Federalist Papers: "Justice is the end of government.
It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obNO. 51, at 350-51 (J.
tained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." THEFEDERALIST
Madison). See abo THEFEDERALIST
NO. 78 (A. Hamilton).
56. Former Vice-president Mondale put it plainly:
We operate under a judicial structure largely unchanged 'from the one designed
200 years ago for a handful of new Americans in 13 small states on the eastern
seaboard. We expect the same system, today, to meet the needs of 210 million
very different kinds of people spread over 53 separate jurisdictions in the most
modern and complex society ever seen on the face of the globe.
Address by W. Mondale to the Second Judicial Circuit Conference (Sept. 10, 1977), reprinted in Hearings on the State of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 794.
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The growing adjudicative and administrative obligations of
the federal judiciary should be placed in historical context; it is
helpful to ponder past experiences before turning to present
problems and before trying to formulate solutions for the future.
Long ago Maitland observed, "To-day we study the day before
yesterday, in order that yesterday may not paralyse to-day, and
to-day may not paralyse to-morrow."" To paraphrase Professor
Bickel, a knowledge of the past can assist us to "remember the
future."58

A. Early Development
During the early days-indeed during the first one hundred
years-of the federal judiciary, there was not much concern
about judicial administration. The workload was relatively low
and the numbers of judges and subordinates were well within
manageable limits?
With the development of the modern industrial state, however, came new and unforeseen pressures on the courts and the
legal profession. The last three decades of the 19th Century, in
this and other countries, were a period of rapid social, economic,
and technological changee60The influence of the railroad, development of mass communication, expansion of the factory system
and of commercial organizations, shifts in the social environment, and diversification of social conciousness all placed tremendous burdens on the legal system, whose job it was to direct
and organize these changes.61
In spite of the new problems that were fast being pressed on
the courts, the need to improve judicial machinery was not immediately recognized. Ultimately, however, congressional perception that the judicial vessel was in danger of running aground
was coupled with a consensus solution, and in 1891 Congress
57. 3 F. MAITLAND,
COLLECTED
PAPERS
439 (Fisher ed. 1911).
58. A. BICKEL,
THESUPREME
COURT
AND THE IDEAOF PROGRESS
102 (1970).
A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN
LAW336-38 (1973); Frank, Justice
59. See L. FRIEDMAN,
Tom Clark and Judicial Administration, 46 fix. L. REV.5, 8 (1967).
60. J. HURST,supra note 6, at 9. European countries were experiencing similar
changes and their court systems were being subjected to the same stresses. By way of
illustration, the caseload of the French Council of State tripled between 1878 and 1908.
~'ETAT
676-77 (1974).
LE CONSEIL
61. See J. HURST,supra note 6, at 15-19.
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passed legislation that created nine intermediate courts of appeals and further defined the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States.62
In 1906 Roscoe Pound, in a classic address to the American
Bar Association, charged that the American justice system was
no longer meeting its assigned functions. He concluded that defects in our judicial system were high among the causes of citizen dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.6s The legal
profession and the legislative branch were loath to accept
Pound's challenge." In fact, there was a concerted effort to prevent the speech from ever being printed?
Nonetheless, a seed had been planted and that seed
reached maturity sixteen years later. Under the patient and
watchful care of Chief Justice, and former President, William
Howard Taft, legislation was passed in 1922. The legislation fur. ~ ~ the
thered two objectives supported by the Chief J u s t i ~ eFirst,
legislation clothed the Chief Justice with the authority to take
certain specific actions to meet the changing needs of the federal
courts. For example, he was given authority to assign district
court judges to serve anywhere in the country, provided there
was a certificate of need from the circuit requesting assistance
and a certificate of availability from the circuit providing the
helping hand?' The involvement of the circuits was noteworthy
because it demonstrated an early congressional awareness of the
politically significant factor of localism or decentralization.
Second, the 1922 Act established the Conference of Senior
Circuit Judges (today known as the Judicial Conference of the
United state^).^^ The conference was given general responsibil62. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
63. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964) (address to the American Bar Association, Aug. 26, 1906, at St.
Paul, Minnesota).
64. Members of the organized bar were so outraged that they accused Pound of attempting "to destroy that which the wisdom of the centuries has built up." Wigmore,
Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906, 20 J. AM. JUD.
SOC'Y
176, 177 (1936) (quoting
Mr. Spoonts of Texas). But, within one year, the ABA apparently agreed with Pound.
This led to the appointment of a special committee which was assigned the task of examining existing evils in judicial administration and then proposing remedies to cure those
evils. Pound was one of the committee's members. See 31 A.B.A. REP. 505 (1907); 34
A.B.A. REP.578 (1909).
65. Wigmore, supra note 64, at 177.
66. See Myers, Origin of the Judicial Conference, 57 A.B.A.J. 597 (1971).
67. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 5 3, 42 Stat. 837.
68. Id. 5 2. As part of a general recodification of title 28 of the United States Code,
the Judicial Conference of the United States was renamed in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948,
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ity to make a comprehensive survey of the condition of business
in the federal courts, to prepare plans for the transfer and temporary assignment of judges to meet varying docket demands,
and to submit to Congress suggestions concerning uniformity
and the expedition of the federal courts' bu~iness.~@
Considered collectively, these two changes comprised the
first statutory effort in this nation's history to treat the federal
judicial system as a single entity.1° Although it was a significant
step forward, this initial reform quickly exposed a need for further congressional action. The Judicial Conference met only
once a year and lacked an administrative st&. It was thus unable to effectively discharge its responsibilities. For example,
without a comprehensive, reliable system of statistics, it was virtually impossible to identify and devise solutions to court
problems.
As a consequence, seventeen years later-on joint resolution
of the Attorney General and the Judicial Conference, with active
support from Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes-Congress acted again," passing the Administrative Office Act of 1939, probably the greatest judicial administrative package ever passed in
this nation's history.7a

B. The Administrative Offiee Act of 1939
By enacting the Administrative Office Act of 1939, Congress
achieved at least three major objectives. First, an entirely new
institutionthe Administrative Office of the United States
Courts-was created to assume the responsibility of administerch. 646, 62 Stat. 902.
69. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, # 2, 42 Stat. 837.
70. J. HURST,supra note 6, at 114.
71. Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501,53 Stat. 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $8 332-333, 456,
601-610 (1976)).
OF FEDERAL
For an excellent history of this legislation, see P. FISH,THE POLITICS
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
125-65 (1973). See also Administration of United States
Courts: Hearings on H.R. 2973 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Administration of U.S. Courts].
72. The House Report recognized this by stating, "[Ilt is believed by many of the
bench, bar, and laity that the pending bill is the most important ever presented to Congress for the improvement of Federal judicature." H. R. REP.NO. 702, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1939). An illustrious court reformer understated while testifying on the proposed
legislation: "This bill seems very general and very gentle . . ., but I think it has teeth in
it that are longer and will cut deeper, if necessary, than you would suspect at first reading." House Hearings on Administration of U S . Courts, supra note 71, at 27 (statement
of Arthur T. Vanderbilt).
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ing the federal courts, including the preparation of the judiciary's budget." The Administrative Office was also given the responsibility for gathering statistics about the federal courts'
workload. The Director of the Administrative Office was asked
to report these statistics annually to both the Congress and the
Judicial ConferenceJ4In addition, the Judicial Conference's own
authority was augmented by giving it supervisory authority over
the Administrative Office.76
Second, by what has been characterized as a "magic touch
of decentralization,"le the Act created another new institution:
the judicial council of the circuits, or circuit councils." Composed of the active circuit judges of each circuit, the circuit
councils were asked to work for the effective and expeditious
transaction of the business of the circuit's various courts.78 The
Act further directed the circuit's district judges to promptly
carry into effect all orders of the circuit council and increased
the circuit's chief judge's responsibility by requiring him to preside over the council's semi-annual meeting.19
Third, the legislation provided that there be a judicial conference in each circuit made up of all the circuit's district and
circuit judges, together with designated members of the bar. The
conference was given the broad mandate of reviewing the circuit's business and studying how the administration of justice
therein might be improved. The conference's actions were to be
communicated to the circuit council, which was empowered to
respond ac~ordingly.~~
73. This was previously the responsibility of the Justice Department.
74. Act of Aug. 7,1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 5 305,53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (codified a t 28
U.S.C. $5 601, 604 (1976)).
75. Id. 5 305 (codified a t 28 U.S.C. 5 604(a) (1976)).
EVANSHUGHES
687 (1951).
76. M. PUSEY,CHARLES
77. See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 5 306, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified a t 28
U.S.C. 5 332 (1976)).
78. Id.
79. Id. Until the Judicial Councils Reform Act was passed in 1980, the original 1939
provision (codified at 28 U.S.C. 5 332 (1976)) essentially remained unchanged. Only two
amendments of note occurred. The first was in 1948, as part of a general recodification of
title 28. The most important language change was adoption of the phrase that "[elach
judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within the circuit." 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d) (1976). The
Reviser's Note indicated that this was just a change in "phraseology." H.R.REP.NO. 308,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. A46 (1947). The second change was in 1971, with enactment of the
Circuit Executive Act. See notes 85-87 and accompanying text infra.
80. See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 299, ch. 501, 5 306, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified
a t 28 U.S.C. 5 333 (1976)).
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C. Recent Reforms and Present Structure
After the enactment of the Administrative Office Act of
1939, nearly three decades went by before passage of the next
major reform. In 1967 the Federal Judicial Center was created.81
Established as a separate entity within the judicial branch, the
Center was given responsibilities over research, judicial training,
The legislation provided that the
and system devel~pment.~~
Center would be the source of recommendations to Congress, to
the Judicial Conference, and to the legal community in general.s3
The Act also created a Federal Judicial Center governing board,
chaired by the Chief Justice, and composed of the Director of
the Administrative Office and five judges elected by the Judicial
C~nference.~~
Shortly thereafter, in 1971, another judicial administation
reform occurred with the enactment of the Circuit Executive
The Act provided the chief judge of the circuit and the
circuit council with a court executive authorized to exercise various administrative responsibilities.se The enacted legislation specifically envisioned that the new court officer-the circuit executive-would act as an arm of the circuit council. It further
anticipated that this court administrator would assist the court
of appeals in improving its internal management and
organizati~n.~~
The present administrative structure of the federal judiciary

.

81. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 8 101, 81 Stat. 664 (codified a t 28
U.S.C. 5 620 (1976)). For an excellent paper on the creation of the Federal Judicial
Center, see Address by R. Wheeler, The Creation of the Federal Judicial Center as a
Case Study of Innovation, Autonomy, and Control in Judicial Administration (June 5-8,
1980) (Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Madison, Wisconsin).
82. 28 U.S.C. 5 620 (1976). See also S. REP.NO. 90-781,90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
reprinted in [I9671 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS2402.
83. 28 U.S.C. 5 620 (1976).
84. Id. 8 621.
85. Pub. L. No. 91-647, 84 Stat. 1907 (1971) (codified a t 28 U.S.C. 5 332(e)-(f)
(1976)).
86. Id. See also S. REP.NO. 91-1511, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [I9701
U.S. CODECONC.& AD. NEWS5876. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, added a sixth judge to the Center's Board.
87. As enunciated by the Senate Judiciary Committee, "improved management of
the courts should have a substantial effect on the ability of judges to perform their judicial function without having to spend significant time on court administration." S. REP.
No. 91-1511, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in [I9701 U.S. CODECONG.& AD.
NEWS5876, 5878.
& S. FLANDERS,
For more information about circuit executives, see J. MCDERMOTT
THE IMPACTOF THE CIRCUITEXECUTIVE
ACT (Federal Judicial Center 1979).
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has developed as described in this brief history? Its general
characteristics are as follows. First, it is a total ecosystem covering the entire federal judicial system; a change in one part of the
structure creates aftershocks felt throughout. Second, it exists
within the judicial branch of government and it is judge-controlled. It is therefore consistent with constitutional dictates of
separation of powers because it promotes and protects the independence of the judiciary. Third, it is a decentralized system
with significant elements of localism and personalism. Fourth,
its formal organization is pyramidal. At the apex is the Judicial
Conference of the United States and its chairman, the Chief
Justice of the United States. The twelve circuit councils, chaired
by the chief judges of the circuits, are midway down the pyramid. The circuit executives and the judicial conferences of the
circuit accompany the circuits' chief judges at this midway level.
The district judges, for the most part lacking system-wide administrative authority (except to the extent that they participate
in circuit and Judicial Conference affairs), are of course at the
base of the pyramid. The Administrative Office of the United
States Cowts provides centralized staff assistance to the entire
structure. And the Federal Judicial Center provides a critically
needed education, development, and research component.
It is within this framework that future attempts to improve
judicial administration will be brought before the Congress.

The federal circuit council, a relatively unknown judicial institution, has already been subjected to insightful analysis.8e
Nonetheless, the reasons for the initial 1939 legislation creating
the judicial councils need to be emphasized and some of the intervening problems identified in order to provide a basis for dis88. In spite of dramatic changes in the number of judges and court personnel,
caseload (both in terms of numbers and complexity), and jurisdiction, the administrative
structure of the federal judiciary has remained remarkably stable. Meador, The Federal
Judiciary and its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV. 1031 (1979).
89. Two of the best law review articles on this subject are Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U . CHI. L. REV. 203 (1970),
supra note 71, at 152-65 for a comprehenand Wallace, supra note 17. See also P. FISH,
sive and excellent analysis of the federal court system. For a thorough evaluation of the
& J. MCDERMOTT,
OPERATION
OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
circuit councils, see S. FLANDERS
COUNCILS(1978), and Mr. Justice Harlan's minute examination of the history of the
councils in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 US.74, 96-104 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
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cussing the recently enacted Judicial Councils Reform Act.

A. The Creation and Development of Circuit Councils
The circuit councils were the handiwork of Chief Justice
Hughes, who had the active support of the powerful Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman Hatton Sumners.@"Chairman Sumners had been a manager for the House in
the lengthy impeachment trial of Judge Halstead Ritter. From
that experience Sumners concluded that there was a need for a
better mechanism to discipline federal judges?' Chief Justice
Hughes, for his part, was deeply committed to improving the
overall administration of the business of the courts. Both men
thought that a decentralized institution could be created-one
that paid great attention to local authority and responsibility.
At the 1938 session of the Judicial Conference, Hughes proposed the creation of a mechanism that would concentrate responsibility in the circuits. The new entity would be assigned
immediate responsibility for the work of the courts within the
circuit. It would have the power and authority to do what was
necessary to ensure competence in the work of the various districts within the circuit.92
The Judicial Conference approved the Chief Justice's proposal in principle and asked a committee to prepare a legislative
proposal "embracing a provision looking toward the establishment of judicial councils or some other like method within the
several circuits and the District of Columbia for the control and
improvement of the administration of justice therein.'"
The bill was prepared, introduced, and ultimately enacted.
The section relating to circuit councils was enacted precisely as
it was proposed by the Judicial Conference. Emanual Celler,
90. Fish, supra note 89, a t 206.
91. P. FISH,supra note 71, a t 154. See 80 CONG.REC. 5468-73 (1936) (remarks of
Rep. Sumners). After the impeachment of Judge Ritter, Chairman Sumners became an
enthusiastic supporter of judicial discipline legislation. See, e.g., H.R. 2271, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937).
It is noteworthy that the Halsted Ritter impeachment was the last successful removal of a federal judge from the bench. See STAFFOF IMPEACHMENT
INQUIRY
HOUSE
COMM.ON THE JUDICIARY,
9 3 CONG.,
~ ~ 2~ SESS.,REPORTON CONSTIUTUTIONAL
GROUNDS
FOR PRESIDENTIAL
~PEACHMEN
(1974).
T
92. See Transcript of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference 174-92 (Sept. 30,
1938).
93. REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE US. 12 (Sept.
1938).
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then a member and later Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, observed several years later:
The language of title 28, United States Code, section 332
was recommended to the Congress in 1939 by the judges themselves and was deliberately worded in broad terms in order to
confer broad responsibility and authority on the judicial councils. It was the considered judgment of the Congress that the
judicial councils were by their very nature the proper agents
for supervisory management and administration of the Federal
courts. The councils are close to all the courts of the circuit
and know their needs better than anyone else and, by placing
responsibility and authority in the councils of the circuits, administrative power in the judicial branch was decentralized, as
it ought to be, and in each circuit kept in the hands of judges
of the cricu@
.ti '

The legislative history of section 332 clearly indicates that
delegation of substantial management power to the decentralized circuit councils was thought to be needed and was broadly
granted." The 1939 legislation gave the councils authority to
make corrective orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within the circuit. The district judges were directed to carry out all such orders. This was
significant because the power to issue orders has never been
grant&d to any other administrative entity in the federal
judiciar~.~~
By the late 1950's the effectiveness of the councils began to
be seriously questioned. Then Circuit Judge Burger charged that
the "Judicial Councils have not fully lived up to the expectation
of the sponsors."s7 One noted scholar described the councils as
94. Celler, Foreward to REPORT
ON THE POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITES
OF THE JUDICOUNCILS
H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. v-vi (1961).
95. The following colloquy between Chief Judge John J. Parker and Congressman
Celler illustrates the intent to give the councils broad powers. Congressman Celler questioned: "Do you put any restraint on the council at all?"
Judge Parker answered: "I do not think this bill does." House Hearings on Administration of U.S. Courts, supra note 71, at 22.
Another federal judge thought that the legislation conferred upon the councils authority to examine a problem and to take "such action as may be necessary to coniect
such a situation." Id. at 11 (statement of D. Lawrence Groner).
96. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1979) (statement of Daniel J. Meador).
97. Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22 F.R.D. 71, 77 (1958) (address by Warren E.
Burger, American Bar Association Southern Regional Meeting, Feb. 21, 1958). In 1959 a
Senate staff report accused the circuit councils of failing to assist in the direction of the
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"pillars of passivity."" A United States Senator accused the
councils of being relatively impotent in meeting their
~bligations.~~
When a case involving the authority of a circuit council
finally reached the Supreme Court, the Court found existing language concerning the circuit councils' powers to be ambiguous.
In Chandler v. Judicial Council,loOthe Supreme Court upheld
two orders of the circuit council of the Tenth Circuit, the first
finding a district judge unable or unwilling to discharge his duties efficiently and directing him to refrain from sitting on any
further cases, and the second superseding the first and authorizing the judge to sit only on cases assigned to him before a certain date.
In upholding the orders the Court avoided the serious issue
of whether the council's orders were administrative in nature
and therefore not subject to judicial review.lol However, the
Court did discuss in dicta the delicate balance that must be
achieved between the need for judicial independence and the exigency for judicial administration. The author of the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Burger, asked the rhetorical question,
"[Clan each judge be an absolute monarch and yet have a complex judicial system function efficiently?"lo2 In an unequivocal
and compelling response, the Chief Justice answered
negatively.lo8
In an important footnote, again in dicta, the Chief Justice
administration of the business of the United States courts. STAFFOF SENATE
COMM.ON
APPROPRIATIONS,
8 6 CONG.,
~ ~ 2~ SESS., FIELDSTUDY
OF THE OPERATIONS
OF THE UNITED
STATES
COURTS
33-36 (Comm. Print 1959).
98. P. FISH,supra note 71, at 404.
99. Federal Courts and Judges: Hearings on S. 952 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 350 (1969) (Letter from Joseph D.
Tydings).
Justice Tom Clark also levelled criticism at the councils. Clark, The Federal Judicial Center-New Hope for the Courts, 36 DISTRICT
COLUM.
B.J. 32, 32 (1969).
100. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
101. Id. at 89.
102. Id. at 85.
103. Id. Chief Justice Burger concluded: "[Ilf one judge in any system refuses to
abide by such reasonable procedures it can hardly be that the extraordinary machinery
of impeachment is the only recourse." Id. For further discussion of whether impeachment is the exclusive constitutional method for disciplining and removing federal judges,
see Judicial Discipline and Tenure: Hearings on S. 295, S. 522, and S. 678 Before the
Subcommittees on Judicial Machinery and Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-17 (1979) (statement of Eugene Gressman) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on Judicial Discipline and Tenure].
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criticized the drafting of section 332.
Standing alone, § 332 is not a model of clarity in terms of the
scope of the judicial councils' powers or the procedures to give
effect to the final sentence of § 332. Legislative clarification of
enforcement provisions of this statute and definition of review
of Council orders are called for.lo4

In a second meaty footnote, the Chief Justice supported the
concept of granting the councils, as administrative bodies, broad
authority to promote the effective and expeditious administration of court business.lo6 This confirmed the 1939 legislation's
original thesis that the circuit councils would become active participants in the management of judicial business within the circuit similar to a board of directors.lO"
The Supreme Court's call for congressional clarification of
28 U.S.C. 5 332 went unheard or unheeded for several years.lo7
Meanwhile, the councils continued to be involved in a wide variety of judicial affairs. Congress continued to give the circuit
councils a wide panoply of administrative responsibilities, viewing them as empty receptacles into which .more authority could
be poured.

B. Authority of the Circuit Councils
The statutory authority possessed by the circuit councils is
of four distinct kinds: (1) the administration of the business of
the courts; (2) the retirement, discipline, and appointment of
certain judicial officers; (3) criminal justice administration; and
(4) the implementation of legislation. These powers are not always oft exercised; nor are they extremely time consuming when
exercised.
1. Authority to Administer the Business of the Courts

In the area-of administering the courts' business, congressional grants of authority to the circuit councils reflect a desire
104. 398 U.S.at 85 n.6.
105. Id. at 86 n.7. This footnote is also dicta.
106. Id. Fur further discussion of Chandler, see Note, The Chandler Incident and
Problems of Judicial Removal, 19 STAN.L. REV.448 (1967).
107. In the meantime, at least one circuit court held that section 332 passed constiutitonal muster. In re Imperial "400" National, Inc., 481 F.2d 41, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973). See also Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1973), which
broadly construed the councils' authority to reduce court delay.
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to make the day-to-day work of the district courts more efficient,
to provide a reviewing body for certain district court administrative decisions, and to allow circuit council intercession when
there is an inability to agree a t the district level on various administrative matters. Statutory illustrations are numerous. Circuit councils review district court plans for the rindom selection
of grand and petit jurors.lo8 Councils must consent to a district
court decision to pretermit the holding of any regular session of
court.lO@When district judges are unable to agree upon the
adoption of rules or orders dividing the business of the court,
the circuit council must intercede and make the necessary orders.l1° The circuit council can even get involved in deciding
where a district judge lives. The council may, by appropriate order, designate the residence of a district judge at or near a particular place within the district if the public interest and the nature of the district court's business so require. If the district
judges are unable to decide among themselves who shall live in
the designated place, the circuit council may make this
decision. l1l
In a similar vein, the council may designate the depository
for the courts' records.ll' The council also may get involved in
decisions relating to court quarters and accomrn~dations.~~~
In
addition, the council shares authority with the chief judge of the
circuit to designate and assign a retired circuit or district judge
to perform such additional duties within the circuit as he is willing and able to undertake.l14 Finally, when the chief judge of
any district court requests additional court reporters, the circuit
council may notify the Director of the Administrative Office,
who arranges for additional reporters on a contract basis.l15
2. Authority to Retire, Discipline, and Appoint Judicial

Officers
Congress has provided the circuit councils with extensive
108. 28 U.S.C. 5 1863 (1976).
109. 28 U.S.C. 140(a) (1976).
110. 28 U.S.C. 5 137 (1976). See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1104 (10th
Cir. 1972); Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972).
111. 28 U.S.C. 5 134(c) (1976).
112. 28 U.S.C. 457 (1976).
113. 28 U.S.C. 5 142 (Supp. I11 1979). The councils' authority, in this regard, was
augmented by the Act of Nov. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-196, 91 Stat. 1420.
114. 28 U.S.C. 5 294(c) (1976).
115. 28 U.S.C. 5 753(g) (1976).
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statutory authority with respect to the retirement, discipline,
and appointment of judicial officers. For example, the councils
have a great deal of authority over the United States magistrates
system. The councils advise the Judicial Conference about the
numbers, locations, and salaries of these important judicial officers.l16 Although a district court may, by a concurrence of a
majority of the district judges, remove a magistrate for cause,
when the vote to remove is tied the magistrate may be removed
by the circuit council.l17 Further, pursuant to the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979,118 which set forth merit selection standards
and procedures for the appointment of magistrates, the circuit
councils were authorized to conduct certification inquiries for
previously appointed magistrates to determine whether these
magistrates are qualified to exercise the expanded trial jurisdiction conferred by the Act?@
The circuit councils also possess authority over other judicial officers. Until April 1, 1984,120the councils will continue to
advise the Director of the Administrative Office as to the number of bankruptcy judges.'" If a district court is unable to decide on the removal of a bankruptcy judge, the council may intercede and order removal.12' After April 1, 1984, removal of a
bankruptcy judge will be by a majority of the judges on the circuit council of the circuit in which the bankruptcy judge
Before an order of removal can occur, a full specification of the charges must be provided to the judge, who must
then be accorded the right to be heard by the c0unci1.l~~
The circuit councils also have statutory authority to appoint
a circuit executive, to delegate such administrative powers to the
116. 28 U.S.C. Q 633(b) (1976).
117. 28 U.S.C. Q 631(i) (Supp. I11 1979). Pursuant to section three of the Judicial
Councils Reform Act, a complaint against a magistrate can be reported to the circuit
council, which has the power to investigate and order various remedial actions, except
that removal must be in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 631. Pub. L. No. 96-458, Q 3, 94
Stat. 2035 (1980).
118. Pub. L. NO. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643.
119. Id. Q 3(f).
120. This is the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, QQ
402, 404, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
121. 11 U.S.C. Q 65(b)(l) (1976).
122. Id. Q 62(b).
123. See 28 U.S.C. Q 153(b) (Supp. I11 1979). Pursuant to the Judicial Councils Reform Act, a complaint against a bankruptcy judge can be reported to the circuit council,
which can investigate and order remedial action, with the exception that removal must
be in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 5 153. Pub. L. No. 96-458, Q 3, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980).
124. 28 U.S.C. Q 153(b) (Supp. I11 1979).
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executive as is deemed advisable, and to approve necessary employees hired by the circuit executive. The circuit executive
serves at the pleasure of the circuit council.la6
Finally, upon receiving a certificate of physical or mental
disability signed by a majority of the members of the circuit
council, the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, may appoint an additional judge to replace any judge in the
circuit who is eligible, but refuses, to retire.lw
3. Authority to Administer Criminal Justice

The councils play an important role in the administration of
the Criminal Justice Actl2' and the Speedy Trial Act.'" Under
the former, the councils are statutorily required to approve the
district courts' plans to furnish representation to individuals
financially unable to secure adequate legal counsel.129Additionally, the councils, after considering suggestions from the district
courts, appoint federal public defendersls0 and determine the
rate of compensation and the number of employees hired by
these public defenders.lsl
Pursuant to the express language of the Speedy Trial Act,
the councils-assisted by a t least one judge from the district
court whose plan is being reviewed-must approve plans prepared to achieve the prompt disposition of criminal cases. If a
district court is unable to comply with the time limits prescribed
by the Speedy Trial Act, the district's chief judge may apply to
the council for a temporary suspension of these limits.'" In deciding whether to grant a suspension request, "[tlhe judicial
council of the circuit shall evaluate the capabilities of the district, the availability of visiting judges from within and without
the circuit, and make any recommendations it deems appropriate to alleviate calendar congestion resulting from the lack of
125. 28 U.S.C. 5 332(e)(f) (1976).
126. 28 U.S.C. 5 372(b) (1976).
127. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 5 3006A (1976)).
128. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1974) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 33 3161-3174
(Supp. 1979)). See also Amendments to Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 96-43, 93
Stat. 327.
129. 18 U.S.C. 5 3006A(a) (1976).
130. Id. 5 3006A(h)(2)(A).
131. Id. The circuit council also may remove a public defender for incompetency,
misconduct in office, or neglect of duty. Id.
132. 28 U.S.C. 3 3174(c) (Supp. I11 1979).
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4. Authority to Implement Legislation

Increasingly, Congress has asked judges to become intimately involved in the administrative implementation of legislation. In part because they serve as links between the trial and
appellate courts and in part because of their power to issue orders, the circuit councils "occupy an ideal position for supervising implementation of legislation."lM
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,1a5which established the goal of eliminating discrimination in the selection and
service of jurors,'" requires every district court to formulate a
written plan that ensures randomness in the compilation of
names of prospective jurors. The councils are assigned the managerial role of monitoring and reviewing the plans, with ultimate
authority lodged in the Judicial Conference.la7 Similar implementation responsibility is delegated to the councils in the
Criminal Justice Act1= and the Speedy Trial Act.lSe
5. Nonstatutory Authority

In addition to the responsibilities statutorily assigned to the
circuit councils, the Judicial Conference has delegated additional
duties to the councils, relying on both its own broad implementing authority and the councils' elastic statutory mandate to promote the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within the circuit. For example, the conference
has asked the councils to develop plans for limiting publication
of judicial opinions.140 In addition, the Conference considers the
circuit council's recommendation when it evaluates the need for
new judgeships.141 Moreover, all bills creating or changing a stat133. Id.
134. Kerwin, Judicial Implementation of Public Policy: The Courts and Legislation
for the Judiciary, 16 Hmv. J. LEGIS.415, 420 (1979).
135. Pub. L. No. 90-274, 5 101, 82 Stat. 54 (current version at 28 U.S.C. $9 18611875 (Supp. 111 1979)).
136. H.R. REP.NO. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [I9681 U.S. CODE
CONG.
& AD. NEWS1792, 1792.
137. 28 U.S.C. 5 1863 (1976).
138. 18 U.S.C.5 3006A(a) (1976).
139. 18 U.S.C. g 3165 (1976).
140. REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICUL
CONFERENCE
OF THE US. 5
(March 1980).
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONPERENCE
OF THE
141. See, e.g., REPORTS
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utory place of holding court or creating or changing a district or
a division within a district must first be considered by the circuit council for its rec~mmendation.~~~
The most significant grant of authority by the Judicial Conference to the circuit councils occurred in March of 1979 in the
challenging and emotional area of creating a mechanism within
the federal judiciary to consider complaints against misbehaving
or disabled judges.141 After having thoroughly studied the issue
and taken the unprecedented step of extending its scheduled
meeting by an extra day in order to thoroughly study the issue,
the Conference expressed its approval of the following principles: (1) "The primary responsibility for dealing with a complaint against a United States judge should rest initially with
'the chief judge of the circuit as presiding judge of the Judicial
Council . . .,"I4' who has power to dismiss a complaint; (2) any
complaint not dismissed by a chief judge should be referred to a
committee appointed by the chief judge, the committee's findings and recommendations being reported to the circuit council;
and (3) the circuit council should then order "such action as is
appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within the circuit," including
referral of a complaint to the Judicial C ~ n f e r e n c e The
. ~ ~ ~Conference further resolved that the circuit councils should "consider the formulation and promulgation of rules of procedure for
the receipt and processing of complaints against judges."14'
This latter resolution was an unmistakable signal to the
U.S. 37 (Sept. 1976).
142. See REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S. 15
(March 1961). This current Conference policy was formulated in part as a response to
Chairman Emanuel Celler's 1959 request that the Conference study the adequacy of the
then-existing places of holding court. See Federal District Court Organization Act of
1978: Hearings on H.R. 12869 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
10, 11 (1978) (statement of Elmo B. Hunter).
Further responsibilities delegated to the circuit councils by the Judicial Conference
OF THE
include deciding whether senior judges are entitled to supporting staff. REPORTS
PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S. 21-22 (Sept. 1950).
143. See REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S. 4-6
(March 1979). This resolution is reprinted and discussed at length in Hearings on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, at 53-106 (testimony of Elmo B. Hunter, James R. Browning,
and J. Clifford Wallace).
144. REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S. 4-6
(March 1979).
145. Id.
146. Id.

722

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I981

councils that they were responsible for handling complaints alleging judicial misbehavior and disability."' In response to this
resolution, every circuit council adopted formal rules of procedure for the receipt and processing of complaints against federal

C. The Need for Reform-Reasons Behind the Judicial
Councils Reform Act
In light of the dynamic developments discussed above, why
was further legislation concerning judicial discipline still sought,
found to be necessary, and ultimately enacted by a busy Congress? It should not be forgotton that the Judicial Conference's
action, as well as the circuit council responses, did not occur in
an intellectual vacuum. The judiciary was under substantial external pressure to improve its own internal operating procedures. The United States Senate, on two occasions, had passed
legislation that created mechanisms generally opposed by members of the federal judicial branch.14@
Further, in the post-Water147. For a discussion of the role circuit councils played in handling complaints of
judicial misbehavior and disability before the reform, see Ward, Can the Federal Courts
Keep Order in their Own House? Appellate Supervision through Mandamus and Orders
of Circuit Councils, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV.233, 247-50.
148. The circuit rules for the receipt and processing of complaints against judicial
officers are reprinted in Hearings on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, at 70-72, 373-456.
At least one circuit has been publishing its circuit orders in the Federal Reports.
See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1980);In re Charge
of Judicial Misconduct, 595 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 593 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1979).
149. Although the Senate had toiled on judicial discipline legislation since the
1930'9, it did not pass a bill until 1978. See S. 1423, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); 124
CONG.
REC.S14,745-49 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978). That bill, passed during the waning days
of the 95th Congress, died a quiet death in the House of Representatives. At the advent
of the 96th Congress, identical legislation was introduced in the Senate. See S. 295, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill, along with two other proposals (S. 522, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) and S. 678,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) were considered during comprehensive hearings by a joint session of two subcommittees. Senate Hearings on Judicial Discipline and Tenure, note 103 supra. These proposals were hotly debated and were finally
subjected to the congressional amendment process. A compromise bill, reported from the
Senate Judiciary Committee (see S. REP. NO. 96-362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in [I9801 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS7767), incorporated the best features of
the three bills. Ultimately, this new bill was passed by the Senate. See 125 CONG.REC.
$15,435 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979).
The Senate-passed legislation accepted for the first time the proposition that complaints alleging disability or misbehavior by federal judges ought to be filed with the
circuit councils. The councils were granted specific statutory authority to dismiss or resolve complaints, except that removal from office was expressly forbidden. A new Court
on Judicial Conduct and Disability was to review the council orders. This court, com-
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gate era, the American public was demanding a higher standard
of integrity and accountability of all its governmental institutions. The judiciary did not escape these demands. As former
Attorney General Griffin Bell observed during Senate hearings,
"We are living in a time when our public institutions are under
examination and the courts are not exempt."1s0
As a consequence, even after the judiciary had acted, there
was substantial political mistrust. A representative of the administration testified that, although the circuit rules concerning
judicial discipline were a definite improvement, they were "not a
satisfactory substitute for congressional action."1s1 The judicial
branch did not contest this. Judge James Browning stated during House hearings, "I believe, nonetheless, that legislation
would still be appropriate in this area."lS2
Once it was clear that there was a substantial consensus
that legislation with respect to judicial discipline was needed,
other reasons for congressional action became apparent. Legislative clarification of the powers of the circuit councils was
thought to be of paramount importance. It was also hoped that a
congressional enactment would increase public knowledge of the
circuit councils' decision-making authority.'" In addition, it was
posed of five sitting article 111judges appointed by the Chief Justice, was also granted
broad authority to dismiss the complaint, or affirm, modify, reverse, or remand any action taken by a council. See S. 1873, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also 125 CONG.
REC. S15,379, S15,419 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini and Sen.
Nunn) .
Despite the consensus approach adopted by the Senate sponsors, a vigorous floor
battle still occurred before the bill passed by a roll call vote of 56 to 33. In opposition,
Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. forcefully argued that the bill was of "dubious constitutionality, . . . unnecessary and . . . unwise as a matter of public policy." 125 CONG.
REC. $ 15,389-90 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
150. Judicial Tenure Act: Hearings on S. 1110 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 142 (1976) (statement of Griffin B. Bell). The cited statement was made before
Griffin Bell became Attorney General. See also 126 CONG.REC. H8787 (daily ed. Sept.
15, 1980) (remarks of Peter W. Rodino, Jr.).
151. Hearings on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, a t 161 (statement of Maurice
Rosenburg).
152. Id. at 89 (testimony of James R. Browning). See also id. a t 59-68 (statement of
Elmo B. Hunter); Browning, Evaluating Judicial Performance and Related Matters, 90
F.R.D. 197 (1981).
153. A Federal Judicial Center report recommended that "awareness of council pow& J. MCDERMOTT,
supra note 89, at 33. This obers should be increased." S. FLANDERS
servation was echoed during congressional hearings: "[there is a] need for more precise
statutory guidelines for the circuits, so that there would be some uniformity and also
some public attention would be focused on the mechanism." Hearings on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, at 174 (remarks of Robert W. Kastenmeier).
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felt that in matters of important national concern, such as judicial discipline, it was desirable for Congress to study and, if possible, resolve the policy questions. Congressional involvement
encourages citizen input on the issue, and allows it to be resolved by democratically elected representatives of the people.
Finally, legislation was attractive because it ensured a certain
level of consistency throughout this diverse country?' These
needs of clarity, public awareness and participation, and nationwide consistency did not necessarily conflict with the earlier desire for flexibility and decentralization, upon which the 1939 circuit council legislation was based. If drafted properly it was
possible that legislation could accomodate all of these objectives.

D. Substantive Content of The Judicial Councils Reform Act
When it became evident that legislative sentiment favored a
statutory solution to the thorny judicial discipline issue, it became necessary to find a consensus formula that could achieve
final passage by the 96th Congress. It bears repeating that passing court reform legislation is an arduous political e n d e a ~ 0 r .Il t~ ~
certainly is "no sport for the short-winded."lM An organized, vocal, and well-financed constituency is lacking, there is a general
resistance to change in our judicial institutions, and the slightest
opposition often is able to paralyze congressional progress.lS7
At the outset, therefore, it was of paramount importance
that a moderate approach be used-one that was built on compromise rather than confrontation and one that would satisfy
constitutional, policy, and budget consideration^.^^^ Like a long154. One congressman complained that the councils' rules lacked uniformity and
noted that this was one of the reasons for the legislation. 126 CONG.REC.H8786 (daily
ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (remarks of Tom Railsback).
155. Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 18, at 339-40.
156. This is Judge Vanderbilt's famous phrase. A. VANDERBILT,
MINIMUM
STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
xix (1949).
supra note 2, a t 198.
157. See H. FRIENDLY,
158. This was exactly the appproach taken to enact the Judicial Councils Reform
Act. With successful passage of judicial discipline bills by the Senate during the 95th and
96th Congresses (see note 149 supra), a growing number of diverse proposals were introduced in the House of Representatives. For an excellent analysis of all of these bills, see
JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINE
AND TENURE
PROPOSALS,
QGTH
AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE,
CONG.,ST SESS.(1979), reprinted in Judicial Tenure and Discipline: Hearings on Judicial Tenure and Discipline 1979-80 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 507 (1979-1980). The bills were
referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which further referred them to its Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, chaired by Robert
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awaited addition to a solidly constructed but too small house,
the Judicial Councils Reform A d accomplished this by using
preexisting columns, walls, and foundation. The Act relies upon
chief judges of the circuits, circuit councils, and the Judicial
Conference of the United States. The breadth and flexibility of
the 1939 statute creating the circuit councils are preserved. At
the same time, improvements are made in five critical areas.
First, the Judicial Councils Reform Act consolidates, and if
anything slightly enlarges, the original grant of authority to the
circuit councils. It accomplishes this by providing that the councils have power to "make all necessary and appropriate orders
for the effective administration of justice within [their] circuit[s]."lW The new phrase "administration of justice" is inserted in lieu of "administration of the business of the
courts."1eo Although it is arguable that both phrases mean the
same thing,"' use of fresh language adds clout and breadth to
W. Kastenmeier.
The subcommittee commenced hearings on the pending proposals during the summer of 1979. See Hearings on Judicial Tenure, note 15 supra. During the hearings,
Judge Elmo B. Hunter-in a significant clarification of the position of the Judicial Conference of the United States--expressed opposition to the creation of any new court or
commission. After recommending that Congress rely more heavily on the chief judges of
the circuits and the circuit councils, he asked the subcommittee to carefully analyze the
need for legislation and then to formulate an appropriate response. Id. at 59-68.
On May 14,1980, after the House hearing record had been closed, the subcommittee
held an informal caucus. It was determined that legislation was necessary, that a draft
bill ought to be prepared, and that the bill should contain various features: specific legislative clarification of the circuit councils' powers, a means to get a difficult complaint
before the Judicial Conference, a requirement that there be some uniformity in council
rules, district judge representation on the councils, and a certain degree of flexibility in
the entire scheme.
The draft bill was then circulated to every member of the subcommittee. Suggestions were received and changes made. Finally, with cosponsorship by every subcommittee member, H.R. 7974 was introduced. See H.R. 7974, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The
bill moved through Committee and the full House without amendment. See H.R. REP.
No. 96-1313,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980); 126 CONG.REC.H8783-88 (daily ed. Sept. 15,
1980).
Differences between the House and Senate bills were then worked out on an informal basis. Compromise changes were incorporated in a DeConcini amendment to the
House bill. The amended bill unanimously passed the Senate by voice vote on September 30, 1980. 126 CONG.REC.S13,854-66 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980). Finally, on October 1,
1980, the House accepted the Senate amendment and sent the bill on its way to the
White House. 126 CONG.REC. H10,188 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980).
159. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, $ 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980)
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d)(l)).
160. See 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d) (1976).
161. The 1961 Judicial Conference Report on the Powers and Responsibilities of the
Judicial Councils, presented to the House Committee on the Judiciary by Chairman
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the statutory text. The House Report confirms this by stating
that the new council powers are broad enough to cover such
problems as the loss of public esteem and confidence in the
court system.ls2 In short, the phrase "administration of justice"
includes the institutional appearance of justice, whereas the
"business of the courts" language reflects concern only with the
courts' technical and internal administrative workings.
Second, the Act gives effect to the broadened mandate by
adding to the circuit councils' statutory power. "Each council is
authorized to hold hearings, to take sworn testimony, and to is~
sue subpoenas and subpoenas duces t e ~ u r n . "A~ ~procedure
is
set forth for the issuance of the subpoenas.ls4 Although circuit
councils have had more success taking informal action,166granting them formal hearing and subpoena power provides them
with a versatile arsenal to meet the difficult case, which in all
likelihood will arise in the context of judicial discipline.ls6 Since
Emanuel Celler, similarly concluded:
The responsibility of the Councils "for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit" extends not merely
to the business of the courts in its technical sense (judicial administration),
such as the handling and dispatching of cases, but also to the business of the
judiciary in its institutional sense (administration of justice), such as the
avoiding of any stigma, disrepute, or other element of loss of public esteem and
confidence in respect to the court system, from the actions of a judge or other
person attached to the courts.
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S. 51 (March 1961)
REPORTS
(emphasis added). For an excellent textbook on judicial administration and for further
& H. WHITCOMB,
JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
analysis of this terminology, see R. WHEELER
(1977).
162. In this regard, the council powers are specifically enlarged to include judicial
discipline and disability. For further discussion of the need for clarity in this area, see
Judicial Tenure Act: Hearings on S. 1110 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-77
(1976) (discussion between Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., and Roman Hruska).
163. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, $ 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980)
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d)(l)). This culminated nearly forty years of efforts to
provide the councils with subpoena power. See, e.g., REPORTSON THE PROCEEDINGS
OF
THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S. (June 1941); REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S. 249-50 (Sept. 1958).
164. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, $ 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980)
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 332(d)(l)).
165. S. FLANDERS
& J. MCDERMOTT,
supra note 89, at 28. Wallace, Must We Have
the Nunn Bill? The Alternative of Judicial Councils of the Circuits, 51 IND.L.J. 297,
314 (1976).
166. During Senate hearings on judicial discipline a federal judge noted that the
lack of subpoena authority had created "difficulty in some instances in getting information which ordinarily is not available." Hearings on Judicial Fitness Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
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it often is difficult to obtain information from the legal profession without the power to compel testimony, the subpoena
power is a significant new weapon for the councils. However, by
not requiring resort to subpoenas and hearings, the legislation
gives the councils the requisite flexibility to solve a matter as
they think best, either informally or by formal hearing with
compelled evidence.
Third, the Judicial Councils Reform Act provides that "[all1
judicial officers and employees of the circuit shall promptly
carry into effect all orders of the judicial council."167 Previously,
district judges were the only ones specifically importuned to respect the councils' orders.'" While it was regarded as implicit
that circuit judges also had to carry out council orders, it is desirable to clarify exactly who falls under the councils' order umbrella. In this context, by specifically stating that all judicial officers and employees are covered, the Act avoids unnecessary
ambiguity. As a result, it becomes patently clear that the councils' authority extends to everyone who works for the federal judicial system a t the circuit and district court levels, be they tenured judges, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, circuit executives,
clerks of court, public defenders, court reporters, secretaries,
l ~ ~ clarity in the statutory text may
bailiffs, or law ~ 1 e r k s . Again,
help to avoid a particularly thorny matter that might arise in
the future.
Fourth, in an important caveat, the legislation states that
"[u]nless an impediment to the administration of justice is involved, regular business of the courts need not be referred to the
[circuit] council."170As the House Report explained, "[t]his language creates a presumption that the council should not be used
as an alternative or back-up appeal route, or as an administra89th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, 11 (1965) (statement of John Biggs, Jr.). A second federal
judge reiterated this during the 96th Congress hearings. Senate Hearings on Judicial
Discipline and Tenure, supra note 103, a t 47 (statexent of J. Edward Lumbard).
167. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 5 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980)
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. $ 332(d)(2)).
168. 28 U.S.C. 5 332(d) (1976).
169. In one of the few judicial decisions to discuss the powers of the circuit councils,
the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit ordered a Pennsylvania court reporter to file a
written report with the Department of Justice and the Administrative Office on aspects
of his unauthorized court reporting practice. The reporter voluntarily complied and did
not test the ambit of the then-statutory scheme-that only district judges had to follow
council orders. I n re Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207 (Jud. Council of 3d Cir. 1950).
170. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980)
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 332(d)(3)).
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tive grievance mechanism."171 What this amounts to-and it is
significant in its import-is that the circuit councils are administrative, as opposed to adjudicative, entities. Again, the House
Report made this very clear:
[Tlhe legislation creates much more of an "inquisitorial-administrative" model than an "accusatorial-adversary'' one. In
this regard, the judicial council is not to be thought of as a
passive and impartial referee; rather, the council can become
the active gatherer of evidence and can control the objectives
and nature of the

In short, the circuit council model envisioned by the recently enacted legislation continues to be that of an administrative body
acting as a "board of directors" for the circuit.17' This body, divorced from direct involvement in the courts' case-by-case disposition of cases and controversies, has authority to monitor the
general administration of justice within those courts.
It goes almost without saying that the circuit councils must
act fairly. Their general mandate to promote the "effective and
expeditious administration of justice" requires this.lV4Yet, as relates to the judicial disability and discipline issue, fears have
been expressed about the possibility of one group of judges
"ganging up" or "hazing" one of their brethren? In response to
171. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980).
172. Id. at 14. In a footnote, the House Report continued: "The 'Inquisitorial' type
procedure has worked well in many of the European court systems and there is little
reason to doubt its adaptability to the proposed legislation." Id. at 14 11.33.
Individuals trained exclusively in the adversary system should not close their minds
to civil law techniques, making the grevious error of using the word "inquisitorial" as an
epithet. "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in the
phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Schaefer, Is the Adversary
supra note 2, at 171. A
System Working in Optimul Fashion, in POUNDCONFERENCE,
highly respected federal judge agrees with this:
Whoever first characterized the continental European system as "inquisitorial"
did a profound disservice to constructive legal thought. Substitute "inquiring"
and the bad becomes the good. The adversary system is not the only way to
the truth; indeed, it has too often been a game in which both sides vie in their
efforts to obscure the truth. Hopefully, by the year 2000, we will have learned
where to preserve the adversary system and where to substitute something
else.
Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Second Phase, vol. I, a t 205 (1974) (statement of Henry J. Friendly).
173. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7 (1970).
174. See Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 5 2(c), 94 Stat. 2035
(1980) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 332(d)(l)).
175. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 140 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissent-
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these fears, the Act clothes the councils' increased discipline
powers with several protective robes. There is a screening procedure for the processing of complaints-first to the circuit's chief
judge and then, if not resolved, to a special committee appointed
by the chief judge. The goal of this process is to ferret out frivolous complaints related to the merits of a judicial decision. If a
complaint is well-grounded enough to proceed past the screening
stage, then basic due process rights must be accorded a judge or
judicial employee who is the subject of the allegations. The Act
expressly provides that the individual complained about must be
give notice of the charges, as well as the rights to appear (in
person or by counsel) to present oral and documentary evidence,
to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to cross-examine
witnesses.176
Moreover, for those matters not resolved at the early stages,
an appeal to the Judicial Conference of the United States may
be available.17' In this manner, the authority of the Conference
to monitor the functioning of the circuit councils with respect to
judicial discipline is augmented. For the first time in its history,
but only in the limited area of judicial discipline and disability,
the Conference (or a standing committee thereof) is given the
power to make necessary and appropriate orders in the excerise
of its authority. In addition, the Act provides the Conference or
a standing committee thereof with discretion to hold hearings,
take sworn testimony, and issue subpoenas or subpoenas duces
tecum. Last, the Conference may proscribe rules for the exercise
of authority under the Act.17' The augmented power of the Judicial Conference, if used widely and sparingly, should deter any
potential "hazing" of individualistic federal judges. Combined
with the enlarged authority of the circuit councils, it may actually increase the independence of the federal judicial branch.
The fifth critical area which the Judicial Councils Reform
Act deals with is the composition of the circuit councils. The
recently enacted statute requires district judge representation on
ing). See also Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALEL.J. 681, 712-15
(1979).
176. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 5 3(a), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980)
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 372). For a more in-depth discussion of the procedure to be
used in the councils, see H.R.REP. NO. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-15 (1980).
177. See Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 2035
(1980) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10)).
178. Id. § 4 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 8 331).
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the council^.^^ This change, debated for almost forty years,180
was made to ensure participation in council affairs by lower
court judges who, it is safe to say, possess a greater degree of
experience in the operation of trial courts. Their knowledge and
perspective are essential to fair and evenhanded council decisionmaking, not only on disciplinary matters but also on all judicial administration subjects. A highly respected circuit judge observed, "[Dlistrict judges have concerns and insights which
would make their presence in the circuit council particularly adv a n t a g e ~ ~ In
~ .addition,
" ~ ~ ~ by expanding the participation base
of an important decisionmaking entity, the Act heightens the
democratic credence accorded the decisionmaker. The primary
recipient of council orders has been the district court. Because
the Act calls for the input of district judges in the decisionmaking process, the credibility these judges accord to final decisions
is likely to rise.lS2
With certain provisos, the legislation delegates to the circuits the authority to specify the size and nature of the councils,
as well as the method to be followed in selecting its members.
The chief judge of the circuit is the presiding officer. He must *
call a meeting of council at least twice a year. The number of
circuit judges on the council is fixed by majority vote of all circuit judges in regular active service. The number of district
judges is also established by majority vote of the circuit judges
in regular active service, except that on councils with fewer than
six circuit judges, there must be at least two district judges, and
on councils with six or more circuit judges, there must be at
least three district judges.lSs In both instances, district and cir179. Id. 5 2(a) (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 332(a)).
180. This is manifested in a letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Judge D. Lawrence
Groner, reprinted in the House Report on the Administrative Office Act: "If at any time
it is desired to expand the council in the circuits by providing for a representation of
district judges, this can be done by simple amendment without departing from the principle of the provision." H.R. REP.NO. 702, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1939).
181. Wallace, The Nunn Bill: An Unneeded Compromise of Judicial Independence,
61 JUDICATURE
476, 481 (1978).
182. Similar thoughts are expressed in the Senate Report on the Federal Court Improvement Act of 1979. S. REP. NO. 96-304, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
183. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 5 2(a), 94 Stat. 2035 (1980)
(to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 332(a)). This basic framework conforms with a resolution of
the Judicial Conference of the United States. REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE US. 6-7 (March 1979). The Conference's recommendations
were drafted to incorporate "an appropriate degree of 'managerial flexibility.' " Hearings
on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, at 67 (statement of Elmo B. Hunter).
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cuit judge representation can be equal.'"
The Judicial Councils Reform Act thus gives the circuit
councils increased ability to meet the problems they have faced
in the past. However, the burdens and pressures imposed on the
councils will be far greater than they were when the councils
were created in 1939. For one thing, Congress will be watching.
As Senator Dennis DeConcini warned, "[als part of a vigorous
oversight responsibility, I plan to monitor implementation of the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act."18s During debate on the
judicial discipline issue in the House, Congressman Caldwell
Butler agreed: "I would like to impress on my colleagues the importance of conducting congressional oversight in this most sensitive area."ls6
To facilitate this congressional oversight, the legislation
contains a report-back provision. The Director of the Administrative Office must include in his annual report a summary of
judicial discipline and disability complaints, "indicating the general nature of such complaints and the disposition of those complaints in which action has been taken."ls7 Similarly, the circuit
councils and the Judicial Conference (or a standing committee
thereof) must make available to the public every order issued to
implement a remedial or sanctioning action.lM In short, rather
than entering into a period of hibernation, the councils can expect to have their new authority and broadened powers more
carefully scrutinized by the public, press, bar, and Congress.18s
With the new set of measures provided by the Judicial
Councils Reform Act, the circuit councils should be ready to
commence the decade that will celebrate the two hundredth
birthday of the United States Constitution. Hopefully, in response to the accompanying augmented public and political
scrutiny, the councils will succeed in satisfying their new
184. See, e.g., STH CIR.RULEGOVERNING
THE RESTRUCTURING
OF THE JUDICIAL
COUN2 (1981).
185. 126 CONG.REC.S13,858 (daily ed. Sept. 30,1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
186. 126 CONG.REC.H8788 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Butler).
187. Judicial Councils Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 8 5,94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (to
be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 604(h)(2)).
188. Id. $ 3 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 372(c)(15)). In all other instances rights to
confidentiality are preserved, unless the material is needed for an impeachment or a
written waiver is obtained. Id. (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. 8 372(c)(14)).
189. For an example of how the press scrutinizes the circuit councils, see Hearings
on Judicial Tenure, supra note 15, at 106 (testimony of Clark Mollenhoff and Greg
Rushford).
CIL
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mandate.

E. Objectives of Judicial Administration Emphasized by the
Judicial Councils Reform Act
The Judicial Councils Reform Act lends new emphasis to
several desirable objectives of judicial administration. These include (1) decentralization of administrative authority in the circuit councils, (2) unification of the court system, (3) increased
responsibility through clearer delegation of authority to the
councils, (4) maintenance of flexibility, rather than adherence to
detailed rules, in controlling the work of the councils, and (5)
preservation of a rational relationship between basic governmental theory and the day-to-day administrative workings of the judicial system.
1. Decentralization of Authority

Since the early days of this nation, judicial administration
machinery has been constructed on the solid principle of regional and individual decentralization of authority. By selecting
the twelve circuit councils as recipients of the judicial discipline
authority, by rejecting the creation of a centrally located (undoubtedly somewhere near the Potomac River) court or commission, and by adding district court representation to the councils,
Congress has once again given its approval to a significant
amount of localism in the administration of the federal
judiciary.
Of all the issues in the recently passed legislation, thiq was
the one about which the judges themselves were most concerned.
In arguing that creation of a national office was fraught with
long-term dangers, Judge Elmo Hunter concluded, "An institutionalized office-any such office-be it a bureau in an executive
agency, a subcommittee of Congress, or an administrative unit in
the court system-has a natural tendency to perpetuate its own
existence."lM This argument prevailed. The structure of the fed190. Id. at 65 (statement of Elmo B. Hunter). Judge Hunter continued his argument
by stating:
If you create an office specifically designed only to investigate judicial misbehavior and authorize it to exercise extensive powers, how long will it be before
that office feels compelled to demonstrate its worth by establishing impressive
precedents? I do not wish to overemphasize that concern, because it may be a
peripheral one; I can, however, assure you that it is extensively shared by many
judges.
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eral judiciary remains decentralized, hierarchical (in the sense of
courts and not judges), and pyramidal. Total centralization of
function is the exception rather than the rule.lel
2. Unification

Carefully structured decentralization of specific responsibilities does not conflict with the overall requirement of court unification, also stressed in the reform. "A unified court system is
one that is organized according to uniform and simple divisions
of jurisdiction and operates under a common administrative authority."ln The Judicial Councils Reform Act does not prevent
court unification by creating totally autonomous circuit councils.
By also increasing the Judicial Conference's authority to oversee
the councils, the Act actually reinforces the existence of a common administrative authority in the federal judicial family. In
addition, by continuing to rely on the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts for st& and budgetary support, on the
Federal Judicial Center for research assistance, and on the Chief
Justice of the United States and the chief judges of the circuits
for leadership, the Act treats the federal judiciary as a unified
entity.
Unification in the administration of the federal courts is
also accomplished by management structure and techniques that
are consistent and clear.leS Consistency should be achieved by
the Act's conferral of clearer authority upon the circuit councils
and by increased public scrutiny and more vigorous congressional oversight, both of which should minimize the uncertainty
and inconsistency which have resulted from the ambiguity that
previously characterized the circuit councils' responsibilities.
3. Increased Responsibility

A third objective of the reform is responsibility. Good administration implies that someone or some entity must stand
out as the decisionmaker to be held accountable if the system is
Id. (emphasis in original).
191. Judge Clifford Wallace emphasized this factor during' his congressional testimony: "[Tlhe entire structure is built upon the principle of decentralization of authority." Id. at 76 (testimony of J. Clifford Wallace).
192. ABA Standards Relating to Court Organization 4 (Tentative Draft 1973).
In a structure as hierarchical and loosely organized as the federal court system, total
uniformity does not have to be the paramount goal.
193. Id. at 12.
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not working properly or if it is not functioning as efficiently as it
might. Responsibility depends on a clear statement of authority,
an adequate grant of tools to make and enforce decisions, eonfidence and willingness to use the given tools, and credibility and
acceptability by those who must abide by the decision.
The Judicial Councils Reform Act specifically upgrades and
defines the authority of the chief judges of the circuits. It clearly
identifies the circuit council as the decisionmaker for a wide variety of issues, including complaints against disabled and misbehaving federal judges. At the same time, it provides the councils
with a concise statement of their authority and powers. It also
allows, in the context of juducial discipline and disability, the
Judicial Conference to act through a standing committee appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States. Last, when an
order is entered against a misbehaving or disabled judge, the Act
requires that it be made available to the public. Each such order
must be accompanied by written reasons therefor unless contrary to the interests of justice.
4. Flexibility

The legislation also stresses the theme of flexibility. Indisputably, our justice system is a product of competing and constantly changing societal, economic, political, and geographical
factors. Law is a bit like an armistice, a provisional peace in
which diverse and conflicting social forces consent temporarily
to suspend open warfare on the basis of a cease fire agreement
that each will maintain the positions conquered. Justice systems
therefore seek to achieve, for a time a t least, peace and balance
between competing forces. To succeed in this, courts and judges
need a generous amount of flexibility to meet the ebb and flow
of societal pressures before them.
The circuit council reform nourishes flexibility in judicial
administration by improving an existing institution and by
broadening its mandate, while not being unduly specific or detailed. It delegates a large dose of discretion to sitting judges. It
respects the need to provide substantial protection for judges
who are the subject of complaints without so exaggerating the
desire for due process rights as to make the procedure ineffectual. Finally, it affords the public adequate protection from the
occasional corrupt judge without creating open season on judi-
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cia1 offi~ers.'~
A mechanism to screen out frivolous complaints is
set forth; a diverse arsenal of decisonal weapons is provided; an
inquisitive administrative process is encouraged; non-judicial
branch personnel are not added to the new councils; a new court
or commission is not created; there is no centralized bpeaucracy; and ironclad adversary procedures are not mandated.
5. Rationality

Finally, the Judicial Councils Reform Act seeks to meet the
theoretical test of rationality. "Theory is the most important
part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a house."lB6Rationality requires the identification of a present problem, the formulation of a policy goal, and a finding that the proposed action will
solve the desired goal without undue disruption. A look at the
legislative history of the Act reveals that this test was followed
and met.
At the outset, Congress was importuned to "measure the
need for the legislation and then to draft a logical, economical
and fair solution to the problem."InAccordingly, a problem-of
less scope than some had argued, but greater in magnitude than
some had hoped-was first identified. Next, the policy objective
was formulated: "To improve judicial accountability and ethics,
to promote respect for the principle that the appearance of justice is an integral element of this country's system of justice,
and, at the same time, to maintain the independence and autonomy of the judicial branch of government."lW Finally, with the
cooperation of all three branches of government, a finding was
made that a compromise-consensus piece of legislation was appropriate to meet the desired goals.lB8In short, Congress-with
input from the judicial and executive branches-found that the
principle of judicial independence is not mutually exclusive with
the effective and expedititous administration of justice.
194. H.R. REP.NO. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980).
195. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.L. REV.457, 477 (1897).
196. 126 CONG.REC. H8785 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
197. 126 CONG.
REC.S13,858 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
198. In letters from Hon. Benjamin Civiletti to Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (Sept. 11,
1980) and Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier (June 14, 1980), representatives of the executive and judicial branches expressed their firm support for the
legislation. See also 126 CONG.REC.H8785 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
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Related to rationality is the proposition that the benefits of
court reform should not just flow to judges, lawyers, or court administrators, but to those most affected by the legal process-the litigants. "By all means let us reform that process, let
us make it more swift, more efficient, and less expensive, but
above all let us make it more just."lee The quality of justice can
be improved by increasing judicial accountability and by improving judicial administration while respecting judicial independence. The beneficiaries of such changes are not only judges,
lawyers, and c ~ u r tadministrators, but also litigants-the consumers of this country's justice system.

IV. CONCLUSION
The maintenance of an effective and efficiently administered federal judiciary requires periodic reevaluation of the system currently responsible for ensuring that the courts' work is
being done well. The most recent evaluation was done by Congress during the consideration and passage of the Judicial Councils Reform Act of 1980. The Act is not a panacea for all judicial
administration problems. It is, however, more than mere tinkering. It provides the federal judiciary with an implement-a boat
hook, if you will-to reach and hold tightly to the constantly
moving and heaving ship of the people.'OO It provides judges and
court administrators with a means of accomplishing the very difficult task that the Constitution and Congress have assigned to
them-administering justice in an equal, fair, impartial, expeditious, and inexpensive manner in ever-changing conditions.

199. Higginbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, in POUND
CONsupra note 2, at 87,110. In this regard, the needs of the poor, weak, powerless,
FERENCE,
and under-represented should receive special consideration.
200. Reflecting on the need for men and machinery to work together, Pound aptly
observed: "Things are done by the combined working of men and machinery. In that
machinery is no negligible item. The right men will do much no matter what machinery
is given them to work with. But our ideal must be the right men with the right machinery." R. POUND,
ORGANIZATION
OF COURTS
293 (1940).

